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Culture & Cognition in a
Complex Megaorganization:
Implications for Military Leadership
Breena E. Coates and Charles D. Allen
Political scientist,
Samuel Huntington (1993)
posited that future global
politics and conflicts would
center on clashes between
civilizations. Indeed, his
prophetic words were
realized in 2001 when
individuals from a radical
Islamic movement were
willing to kill themselves
and thousands of other
innocent people in just such
a clash of cultures and
ideologies (Van Otten,
2005). The U.S. military
commander, General
Stanley McChrystal (2009)
in testimony before the
House Armed Services
Committee, stated that
despite many deployments
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to the region, there is “much
in Afghanistan I do not
know.” Though well-versed
in military arts, the
general’s comment
appeared, at least in part, to
refer to the often baffling
norms of the multicultural
environment in Afghanistan.
The recent 30,000 military
personnel surge in
Afghanistan announced by
President Obama on
December 1, 2009, and the
$10. 6 billion in budget
supplementals for 2010
atop the $14 billion spent
since 2001, calls for
renewed analyses on why
conflict and chaos in the
region has not subsided
with both Soviet and
American traditional use of
overwhelming military
force—hard power.
It is essential that the
U.S. military adapt and
accommodate interactions
with other cultures and
societies (Conway, 1995).
Cultural understanding
does not necessarily occur
even after living in a given
culture. We suggest that
understanding comes in
comes in successive stages
as illustrated in Figure 1.
When organizational leaders
appreciate and seek to
progress through the stages,
cultural understanding can
be accelerated with positive
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effects. After nine years of
military engagement, the
U.S. collective
understanding of the Afghan
culture appears to have
progressed beyond naivety
to Stage 2, Superficial
Understanding. The lack of
sustained results and
ongoing challenges in the
region require U.S. civilian
and military leaders to
develop a Profound
Understanding of the
Afghan people and their
society. Doing so may
generate acceptance and
commitment of the varied
stakeholders and ultimately
support the U.S. strategic
vision for Afghanistan to
become a secure and stable
democratic nation. Profound
understanding involves not
just understanding the
verbal, but also the nonverbal communications. The
latter requires greater
sophistication in reading
communications and
actions by key players,
which will be addressed
later in this paper.
How can America better
win the hearts and minds of
people from such distant
civilizations and traditions
as Afghanistan since the
use of traditional military
force as hard power has not
worked? Nye (2008) argued
that the crisis in the Middle
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Figure 1
Stages of Cultural Awareness

East points to the
sophistication in reading
communications and
actions by key players,
which will be addressed
later in this paper.
How can America better
win the hearts and minds of
people from such distant
civilizations and traditions
as Afghanistan since the
use of traditional military
force as hard power has not
worked? Nye (2008) argued
that the crisis in the Middle
East points to the
ineffectiveness of hard
power and thus, other
elements of power should be
employed. Nye offered that
global situations require a
judicious combination of
hard power that attempts to
coerce and soft power that
seeks to persuade. This
integration becomes
effectively SMART power
designed to achieve strategic
goals and interests. While
the U.S. expends significant
time, efforts and resources
on the coercive elements of
national power to keep its
26

military without peer, the
nation has tended to pay
less attention to the softer
elements of national power,
which require awareness of
cultural aspects in order to
have successful combat
operations and for the
conduct of subsequent
nation-building activities.
We contend that cognitive
influence on culture as part
of soft power is another tool
the military can develop to
advance national security
interests. This paper
expands the notion of soft
power into the realm of
international relations.

Cognitive
Underpinnings of
Culture

When the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff and other
high ranking general officers
search for SMART forms of
power to use, it is important
to place culture within a
cognitive framework; for it is
in the human mind that
cultural synergies and
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conflicts arise. While the
idea that culture matters in
international relations has
been emphasized to our
military personnel, many
may lack the cognitive
underpinnings of how and
why there are differences in
ways that cultures express
meaning. Increasingly, the
security of our nation in no
small measure depends on
how military leaders rapidly
analyze and adapt to other
cultures, which require a
sophisticated depth of
cultural understanding.
Culture does not exist as
a factor distinct and apart
from the human mind,
rather humans in their
interactions actively
construct meaning about
their environments based on
cognitive interpretations. As
noted by Clifford Geetz
(1973: 5), “man is an animal
suspended in webs of
significance.” These webs of
significance created by
human minds about their
environment influence what
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Figure 2
America’s Multiple Sources of Power

is called “culture”— to
include that shaped by
national, regional,
professional, military
service, and organizational
experiences. These
experiences are symbolically
portrayed in Figure 3. We
propose five essential kinds
of cognitive and cultural
understandings for military
leadership and Department
of Defense decision makers.
First, the U.S. forces must
interact in significant ways
with cultures in the
countries where they are
deployed, which includes
national as well as regional
cultures. Second, they will
likely be working together
with multinational
forces—i.e., other military
organizations representing
their countries. Third,
military personnel must
understand inter-cultural
differences between service
branches, along with the
various meanings and
symbols associated with
each (Builder, 1989). More
than ever before, they must
appreciate the “joint”
environment in its
similarities and differences.
Southern Business Review

Fourth, they will have to be
cognizant of professional
cultures—engineers, for
example, do not think like
military sociologists and
combat officers do not think
like chaplains. Fifth,
military personnel must
understand themselves
through the application of
critical and reflective
thinking . Within the United
States, social and
environmental changes have
resulted in substantial
cultural diversity and a
broad mix of ethnic groups
is now a part of America’s
armed forces (Breslin,
2000).
It helps to recognize that
military personnel inhabit
intersecting worlds. This
requires thinking styles of
flexibility and adaptability.
In today’s military
environment, recognition of
the need to think outside
the box is captured in the
article title, “Adapt or Die”
(Fastabend & Simpson,
2004). U.S. Army Colonel
Deborah Cusimano recalled
a time when she was
assigned to working with a
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Turkish Colonel in NATO, as
well as supervising female
non-commissioned officers
(NCOs) from Turkey. Colonel
Cusimano remembered that
“serving as a female officer
in a predominantly Muslim
country further challenged
my personal adaptability
and professional
sophistication” (Cusimano,
2009). To adapt “gracefully,”
she “studied Turkish
customs, such as clicking
her heels, and engaging in
various cultural courtesies.
She noted that she
intuitively began to master
“the art of non-verbal
communication to
compensate for language
barriers between me and the
NCOs” (2009). From Figure
1., Col. Cusimano was at
Stage 3, Profound
Understanding. It was no
wonder that she reported
that her reading of words,
gestures, and facial
expressions helped build
trust and good relationships
with her Turkish colleagues
and superiors.
Building on the concepts
associated with the stages of
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Figure 3
Cognitive Underpinings of Cultural Awareness in the Military Megaorganization

cultural awareness and soft
power just described, this
article now explores the
concept that there is a
symbiotic relationship
between cultural
manifestations and cognitive
patterns. The article will
then examine the role of
culture in shaping attitudes
and attributions. Finally,
the influence of culture on a
leader’s thinking is
illustrated by its impact on
different aspects of
communication and
decision-making.
Influence of culture on
cognition. Culture is a
complex construct that has
its roots in the discipline of
anthropology, from where it
has influenced the field of
management, along with
other domains of learning
and inquiry in the social
and behavioral sciences.
While no consensus has
evolved for a single
definition of culture,
Ferraro’s definition that,
“Culture is everything that
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people have, think [italics
added], and do, as members
of their society,” emphasizes
thought patterns and
associated manifestations
(1990, p. 18). Another way
to think of culture is to view
it “as a pretested design, a
store of knowledge and an
entire system of coping
skills that has been crafted
by humans who have gone
before…” (Fisher, 1988, p.
44). International
management scholar David
Holt (1998, p. 362)
explained that collectively,
“…shared thinking patterns
help explain religious
preferences, political
mandates, customs, and a
wide variety of social
relationships.” Others, such
as David Holt, explain that
collectively, “…shared
thinking patterns help
explain religious
preferences, political
mandates, customs, and a
wide variety of social
relationships (Holt, 1998, p.
362). In these four different
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definitions, a unifying theme
is that shared relationships
associated with interwoven
systems of beliefs, attitudes,
and behaviors that
determines one’s culture
have a cognitive, or knowing,
aspect.
“Thinking” and
“Knowing” are complex,
veiled, clandestine, and
often unconscious processes
that occur each human
mind. How does one “see”
hidden and abstract
cognitive workings of the
mind, such as one’s own
consciousness and that of
other people? Following
Kant, the data of human
consciousness, though
unseen, can indeed be
comprehended through
individual behavior. When
viewed collectively, cultural
manifestations are simply
actions and behaviors of
groups stemming from
systems of thought. With
the growth of psychological
theory in the 19th century
from the works of Freud,

Southern Business Review

Jung, and their followers,
we have learned that hidden
dimensions of human
constructs, such as selfesteem, introversion and
extraversion are made
known through actions
related in some manner to
one’s interactions within
social systems. Examples of
these actions within social
systems include: power
distance or one’s
relationship to authority
figures, avoidance of
uncertainty (Hofstede,
1980), feelings of obligation
(Trompenaars, 1993), and
mono-chronic versus polychronic time management
(Deresky, 2006, 127). These
actions might then be
evident in the way one
explicitly communicates
verbally, or indirectly
communicates, through
facial expressions, bowing,
hand gestures, or eye
movement.
General officers and
their followers, deployed
around the world, cannot
fail to notice the importance
of the simple statement: “all
people are not necessarily
led by the same evidence to
the same conclusions”
(Fisher, 1988, p. 1). Social
constructions of reality
differ, and thus we see how
human thinking and
subsequent reactions to
universal concerns such as
life threats, human rights,
or bribery, are often culturespecific. Furthermore, these
universal concerns may
have quite different
expressions in language,
symbols, and artifacts
across the geopolitical
spectrum. For the military
leader, it is important to
understand these
differences to facilitate
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positive interaction with
others from different nations
and cultures. This is
especially important when
conducting multinational
operations and negotiating
with, or fighting against, an
adversary. To understand
others, it is essential for
leaders to think critically
about, and be aware of,
their own sociallyconstructed, culture-based
thinking. These cognitions
are manifested in leaders’
biases, attributions,
prejudices, and
assumptions employed in
sensemaking of the
environment. The military
leader will also be
challenged by different
approaches to reasoning
encountered from homecountry nationals, as their
cognitive responses are
further shaped by military
branch, service or intergovernmental organizational
affiliation.
Cognition, attitudes
and attributes. Mental
models or maps created by
cultural thinking are a form
of shorthand by which the
brain interprets its
environment and discerns a
behavioral reaction. These
mental models are created
over time through social
learning and experience.
The equation B=f(P,E),
derived from the work of
noted organizational
behavior theorist, Kurt
Lewin (1946), expresses the
idea that Behavior is a
function of the Person and
the Environment. As such,
the person is active in this
relationship, influencing
and in turn being influenced
by it. The field of
interactional psychology
sheds light on this
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relationship and presents
the basis for understanding
how shared cultural
meanings of the
environment create
attitudes. Attitudes are
hidden phenomena but are
effectively revealed to others
through enacted behaviors
over time. Attitudes are not
immutable; rather they are
socially-learned constructs
that can be changed. Such
changes, however, can be
difficult due to social
pressures for conformance
and punishments for
defection. Put simply,
attitudes are the
interpretation of the
environment based on how
one views a particular
situation with favor or
disfavor (Nelson & Quick,
2006).
Cultures are embedded
with artifacts and actions to
symbolize attitudes. For
example, the range of
actions to include bowing
and use of deferential words
toward the aged in Japan
shows that society’s
reverence for elderly people.
Not all cultures, especially
Western ones, celebrate age
and the day-to-day focus is
more on youthful qualities
manifested in dress and
cosmetics. Similarly, in the
U.S. there is an appreciative
attitude toward rugged
individualism, whereas in
Japan an attitude of
collectivism prevails. This is
captured in the popular
Japanese slogan “the nail
that sticks out gets
hammered down.” It is
critical for military
leadership to recognize that
in Iran and other countries
where Islam is predominant
are collectivist cultures
where there is little
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tolerance for ambiguity,
high need for structure, and
a willingness to sacrifice for
the good of society
(Hofstede, 1980, 1991).
These attributes follow the
Islamist values of
belongingness, social good,
and humility (Ali &
Amirshahi, 2002). Leaders
must take these attributes
into account when
interacting with other
nationalities and cultural
groups.
One aspect of cultural
sensitivity is to recognize
that, in a sincere attempt to
accommodate another
culture’s traditions, one
might not understand the
subtleties of the other
culture. A colonel from an
Eastern European (EE)
military gave the following
humorous story of being
hosted by Western
European (WE) officers.
Both the WE and the EE
officers were intent upon
expressing goodwill but
were caught in an
unintentional cultural
blunder. At each
meal—breakfast, lunch and
dinner—the WE served
vodka. The EE officers were
surprised, but happy at
first, and enthusiastically
toasted health of the Head
of the WE country, and the
President of their own EE
country, alongside their WE
colleagues. While the same
group of EE officers
attended each meal, a
different set of WE officers
served as hosts each time.
Thus, the EE officers had
more occasions to drink the
toasts. Feeling a bit taxed
after a few days of this, the
EE senior officer suggested
to his WE contact in charge
that the vodka be
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decreased. His EE officers,
he explained wanted to
respect the WE custom of
drinking vodka with each
meal, but for his officers to
drink vodka for each meal
was not a good idea. He
informed the WE officer that
EE officers did not usually
take vodka with their meals.
“To his surprise, the WE
officer said that the WE
officers also do not drink
vodka with their meals!
They were only trying to
respect what they thought
was an EE tradition.”
(Mitrega, 2009). This
example illustrates Stage 2,
or Superficial
Understanding of the
Western European hosts of
their Eastern European
guests, as depicted in
Figure 1.
When confronted with
difference in expectations
within a foreign culture
while having to conform to
one’s socially-prescribed
work rules and behaviors, a
leader could experience the
discomfort of cognitive
dissonance (Festinger,
1957). This dissonance
occurs when a state of
tension is created due to an
inconsistency between
attitude and expected
behavior. For example, a
leader might be required to
pay “grease money” to a
person acting as an
intermediary to gain
audience with a higher
authority figure as an
accepted social or cultural
business practice in a
particular country. This
action, however, may go
against the leader’s value
system, which considers
such payment unethical.
The leader has to decide
whether to not have the
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meeting or reconcile the
attitude to match the
needed behavior. This often
may require cognitive
rationalization, such as: the
intermediary is expending
time and energy to mediate
the substantive issue
between the two cultures.
Thus, the person is
performing the service of a
consultant. This sort of
thinking lessens the
dissonance. Military
personnel often experience
such cognitive dissonance.
A U.S. Navy Commander
gave this example of a
common cause of cognitive
dissonance. “In the military,
T.E. Lawrence’s maxim is
often advised: ‘Better to let
them do it imperfectly than
do it perfectly yourself, for it
is their country, their way
and your time is short’”
(Bowers, 2009). Commander
Bowers, like Colonel
Cusimano, could be
assessed to have reached
Stage 3, or Profound
Understanding of cultural
differences.
Attributions and
mental models. Attributions about human
motivation underlie
attitudes. Humans have a
tendency to attribute their
own successes to internal
factors such as intelligence
or ability, while at the same
time they may excuse their
own poor outcomes by
attributing the cause to
external agents. This could
lead to a cognitive bias. The
statement, “I got an A, the
teacher gave me a C” is a
good example of the concept
of The Fundamental
Attribution Error—a bias held
by many people (Ross,
1977). This error is closely
linked to egocentricism or
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what is known as the SelfServing Bias whereby one is
more likely to attribute good
to one’s own kin, race or
nation, and view
others—whether they are
from particular families,
ethnicities or nations in a
less favorable light
depending on the issue.
This becomes particularly
salient when one has
serious disagreements with
the other group as is
common in military
situations overseas. In the
more complex arena of
geopolitical intelligencegathering, cognitive biases
occur in the evaluation of
evidence and perception of
cause and effect. This is
specifically addressed in a
Central Intelligence Agency
publication that states such
bias “… does not result from
any emotional or intellectual
predisposition toward a
certain judgment but rather
from subconscious mental
procedures for processing
information. … a mental
error that is consistent and
predictable” (Heuer, 1999,
p. 14). Awareness of
attributions are particularly
important in foreign affairs
because unconscious
misinterpretations of
motives are prevalent and
“…the most intractable
misattributions are the
products of mindsets of
which the actors are
unaware” (Fisher, 1988, p.
32).
Mental constructs
related to such selected
perceptions such as
communications codes,
attitudes, values, and
beliefs are sociallyconstructed, and thus are
also culturally-related. It is
not the external stimulus
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that produces reaction but,
human perceptions of it that
drive corresponding
behavior (Singer, 1998).
Because the human mind is
bombarded by millions of
impressions at a time,
anything that makes a
single impression stands
out and increases the
probability of it being
noticed by the mind. The
mind notices those
impressions with which it
has had previous
experience—particularly
those related to the cultural
values and beliefs in social
system. The mind is also
selective in its perception to
avoid disturbing the
cognitive structure it has
established over time
(Fisher, 1988). Selective
perception is a kind of
shortcut to action. It is a
way for the “software of the
mind” (Hofstede & Hofstede,
2005) to sort out what
needs to be attended to and
what is worthy of its
attention. Since there can
be severe problems with this
process of selective perception, a U.S. General Officer
or Colonel must be selfreflective about the way
culture implicitly and
explicitly affects
perceptions.

Cultural Influence on
Communication

Human beings convey
their cultural identities
through multiple channels
of verbal and non-verbal
communication. These
channels convey meaning
on how we perceive and
interact within our
environments. Singer (1998)
observed, “it is not possible
not to communicate.”
Humans function as
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message encoders whenever
we communicate and
cognitive coding is based
upon cultural perspectives.
Furthermore, how the
message is decoded is
dependent on the
perceptual screen of the
listener, and this screen is
likewise influenced by
culture. The virtual space
between the encoder and
decoder is believed to
contain cultural “noise,”
which is often the source of
misunder-standings
between communicators.
Since the message is not
always verbal, nonverbal
mechanisms such as
kinesics, proxemics, and eye
movement are also
interpreted. Examples of
how thinking affects
communication means
emphasize the importance
of strategic communication
and building relationships
with leaders from other
cultures.
Word choice matters a
great deal for military
leaders in international
settings. Consider the terms
of deterrence and threat.
Stockpiling nuclear weapons
by one nation-state may be
seen by that state as
“deterrence” against a future
attack, while another state
could view such a stockpile
as a “threat.” The words
associated with describing
the War on Terrorism in
certain strategies has, on
occasion, created
controversy within Islamic
cultures. Military leaders
sometimes make
unintentional mistakes with
language when trying to
build inter-cultural
relationships. Some words
that might seem innocent
enough to one culture could
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be incomprehensible or
offensive to others.
Something as ubiquitous
and innocuous as the word
Coca Cola to an American
translates literally into “bite
the wax tadpole” in Chinese.
The soft drink Fresca in
Mexico is a term for
lesbianism (Holt, 1998).
Electrolux, a European
appliance maker used the
slogan “nothing sucks like
an Electrolux!” in
advertising its vacuum
machines in the United
States (Peng, 2009: 106). An
American expatriate in
Malaysia was introduced to
a “Rajah” which is the name
for a king, or nobleman, in
that country. The American
mistakenly thought the
name was Roger, and
proceeded to call the man,
“Rog” in an attempt to be
affable. The Malaysian
nobleman was offended and
walked away from the
negotiation (Peng, 2009: 14).
From Figure 1, this person
would demonstrate Stage 1,
Naïve Understanding.
Non-verbal
communication and
implied meaning. For
military leaders in
Afghanistan, Iraq and Asian
nations, implied meaning is
important to consider in
international exchanges.
This does not apply to
verbal conversation alone.
Sometimes even silence gets
interpreted incorrectly, as
noted by one expert: “In
some cultures silence is
golden; in others, it makes
people uncomfortable”
(VanOtten, 2005, p. 34).
Interpretations of implied
meaning can cause
diplomatic misunderstandings. A Department of
Defense official related the
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following incident during a
class on culture and
cognition at the U.S. Army
War College.
In 2008 South
Koreans became
fearful of U.S. beef
and this was
exacerbated by
propaganda from
North Korea to
damage U.S. and S.
Korean relations as
well as hyperactive
internet rumors.
Text messages began
to be exchanged:
‘Why must I die like
a mad cow,’ and
suggestions were
made to ‘swallow
cyanide, but don’t
eat U.S. beef.’ A
Korean T.V. station
captured a
statement and
televised it in which
a high-ranking
officer in the U.S.
Embassy made a
remark, “So we hope
that the Koreans will
begin to learn more
about the science
and about the facts
of American beef and
that this issue can
be addressed
constructively,
(Chung, 2009).
The remark, however,
was misinterpreted as
'Korean people need to
study science.' The political
opposition party in Korea
used his facial expression
accompanying these words
as looking down on Koreans
in an arrogant way (Chung,
2009). This incident shows
that facial expression and
non-verbal language are
powerful communications
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tools and must be used with
care in host countries.
There are also other forms
of implied mis-communication such as such as
sarcasm, which can be
easily misunderstood across
cultures and are best
avoided in international
dialogue.
Non-verbal language
constitutes about 90
percent of all meaning in
communication. One of the
most important of these is
eye-movements, which
provide, in most cases, a
rich expression of the
person’s inner being. How
one looks at another while
speaking is also meaningful.
Looking squarely at the
listener is natural in
Western cultures. However,
a hard stare and direct gaze
may be inappropriate
elsewhere. In some cultures
one might look at the
speaker directly and then
look away occasionally, as a
stare could be perceived as
disrespectful—especially
between individuals who do
not have the same social
status—and could be
interpreted as rude or even
threatening. In some
cultures, such as the
Chinese, the “inscrutable
face,” and the military
“poker” face, are either
deliberate or unconscious
methods to avoid
transmission of meaning,
perhaps as a protective
device against misunderstanding.
Proxemics, which
describes how close or far
one stands or sits from
another person, should be
understood when interacting with others in formal
or social settings. People
from western societies
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prefer not to be crowded,
and they stand and talk to
each other about an arm’s
length away. Latin cultures
prefer closer proximity and
will often draw closer to
their western counterparts
while speaking. For
example, in an international
conversa-tion in Mexico, the
Mexican might move toward
the American. Very likely,
the American will take a
step back to maintain a
comfortable distance. The
Mexican may then move
forward to close the gap,
and an unwitting game of
pursuit might ensue.
Kinesics consists of
body, hand, finger or foot
gestures, which significantly
differ across cultures. Thus,
while a military counterpart
in Japan may nod his head
vigorously, and even say
“yes” while during a
conversation, one should
beware of being deluded
into the perception that he
is agreeing. That behavior
might simply mean: “Yes. I
hear you.” Cultures, we
learn, are also defined by
high-contact and low-contact
modalities (Deresky, 2006,
p. 126). Americans tend to
use a firm handgrip when
shaking hands, in some
other cultures this may be
seen as aggressive. In some
countries, such as in India,
handshakes are seldom
used as greeting. Instead,
people might clasp their
own hands together, bow
and say “Namaste.” The
Japanese culture, says
Deresky is considerably less
haptic than others (Deresky,
2006), and thus in a
business situation when
confronted by the
enthusiastic hugging of a
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Spanish counterpart, this
could create discomfort for
the Japanese businessman.
Again, while a person from a
Latin culture might be very
comfortable embracing and
kissing even those of the
same gender, an
Englishman would recoil
from such contact.
The richness of medium
by which the message is
delivered is also a critical
factor and may indicate the
importance one really places
on the issue. The least rich
medium is a memorandum
sent electronically, as one
cannot see expression,
intonation, and other
aspects available to
interpretation in face-to-face
speech. Going one step
further from the memorandum, an audio conference
allows one to interpret voice
inflection but leaves out the
visual. Next in line of richness is a video conference
where one is able to not only
hear but also see, although
in a somewhat limited
manner. The richest
medium by far is a meeting
where listener and speaker
can fully see and hear each
other. In some cultures, a
meeting is the only way to
fully communicate and be
understood.
Finally, those who
become totally immersed in
another culture run the risk
of being perceived as having
“gone native” (Singer, 1998).
Military personnel are
routinely reassigned and
rotated to others region,
hence the need to reflect
upon and appreciate how
one’s culture influences our
internal communications is
essential.
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Cultural Influences on
Decision-Making

The GLOBE mega study
(Chhokar, Brodbeck, &
House, 2007) on cultural
impacts upon societal and
organizational processes,
extends Geert Hofstede’s
classic studies on
dimensions of culture
(1980). The GLOBE Project
also provided finer
distinctions and more subtle
understandings of
organizational cultures than
did the original Hofstede
research. The study also
developed several other
cultural dimensions beyond
those discussed in the
Hofstede studies which are
not a focus of this paper. In
this article we examine of
four of the Hofstede and
GLOBE cultural dimensions
for military and diplomatic
leadership in international
settings: 1) Individualism vs.
Collectivism, 2) Power
Distance, 3) Uncertainty
Avoidance, and 4)
Orientation to Time, to help
understand how culture and
cognition affect decision
making. These particular
cultural dimensions were
chosen for their influences
on U.S. and multinational
operations where there are
increased connections of
countries, and dynamism of
international competition
(House, Hanges, Javidan,
Dorfman, and Gupta House,
2004) that inevitably
contribute to American
successes and failures in
the global arena.
Individualism vs.
collectivism. In the GLOBE
study, two components were
discovered—Institutional
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Collectivism and In-Group
Collectivism. The former
(institutional collectivism)
represents the extent to
which the organization
encourages participation
through rewards and
resource distribution. The
latter denotes individual
loyalties, pride, and
cohesiveness in their
organizations. The Greek
term philotimo is used for
the extent to which an
individual conforms to the
values and standards of his
in-group (Triandis, 1972). In
a collectivist culture, it may
take longer to make
decisions, but the decisions
will likely be thoroughly
developed. In contrast,
American decision-making
is often quickly derived, but
the decisions may need
several incremental tweaks
ex post facto to make it
workable. Collectivist
cultures, like that in Japan,
prefer group consensus
decision-making. Thus in
Japan, the ringi-sho method
of bottom-up decision style
is quite common (Deresky,
2006). Decision-making
processes also translate into
how people are rewarded.
For example, in the modern
Japanese workplace,
organizational rewards and
recognition are group-based
in nature. By contrast,
American like to think of
themselves as individuals
and so seek to be recognized
as such for their
contributions. Professional
cultures, such as the
military, view collectivism as
a useful device for unit
cohesion. While this is
important in many venues
in which military personnel
are engaged, at other times
it might serve as a device to
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thwart dissent, and in its
extreme form can result in
groupthink (Janis, 1972).
Gerras, Wong, and Allen
(2008, p. 12) reported “the
‘Army of One’ slogan, in the
words of one interviewed
soldier, ‘just goes against
everything they taught us.’”
Power distance. In their
studies on “power distance,”
Hofstede and Hofstede
(2005) have shown that
some folks are more equal
than others in any given
society—including an
organizational society. At
the decision-making level,
we speak of power distance
as “the extent to which the
less powerful members of
institutions and
organizations within a
country accept that power is
distributed unequally”
(Hofstede, 1991, p. 28). The
GLOBE study indicates the
levels at which organizational societies accept and
legitimize authority, power
and status differences.
Thus, in countries where
there are strong hierarchies
of class and caste, such as
in India and Britain, we find
that there is separation or
“distance” between
organizational elites or
leaders and ordinary
citizens. In other countries
such as Thailand, leaders
are revered and given
extraordinary respect.
In organizations such as
the military, there are
hierarchies that determine
status and information flow.
Hierarchies can create
challenges for leadership.
For example, if subordinates
believe they are existentially
unequal, they may fail to
give timely and necessary
advice to a leader out of
fear, deference, or feelings of
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insignificance. A military
leader needs to appreciate
this dynamic and take
measures to encourage an
unfettered information flow
to prevent mission failure
because of misplaced
deference. The GLOBE
research shows that while
some level of power distance
is necessary for command,
and that greater benefits
accrue to organizations that
lessen this distance.
Brigadier General
Fastabend and Robert
Simpson (2004, p. 22)
observed the tension in the
Army culture “between
essential centralized control
and necessary,
decentralized innovation.”
The findings of the GLOBE
study suggest that the
insights of junior officers be
given legitimacy without
“overbearance by superiors”
(Gerras, Wong & Allen,
2008, p. 15).
During the tenure of
Donald Rumsfeld as
Secretary of Defense, there
was a higher level of power
distance shown by senior
civilian leaders at the
Department of Defense
(DOD) toward their “junior”
subordinate military
officers—the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and other general
officers. Lieutenant Colonel
Paul Yingling (2007) in his
article on a failure in
“generalship” noted the high
power distance of the
military establishment in
relationship to its civilian
superiors. The indication of
a high power distance
culture and cognition at
DOD is illustrated in Lt. Col.
Yingling’s (2007, p. 23 )
comment: “While the
physical courage of
America’s generals is not in
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doubt, there is less certainty
regarding their moral
courage. In almost surreal
language, professional
military men blame their
recent lack of candor on the
intimidating management
style of their civilian
masters.” Yingling goes on
to say that, “Moral courage
is often inversely
proportional to popularity
and this observation in
nowhere more true than in
the profession of arms. The
history of military
innovation is littered with
the truncated careers of
reformers who saw
gathering threats clearly
and advocated change
boldly. A military
professional must possess
both the physical courage to
face the hazards of battle
and the moral courage to
withstand the barbs of
public scorn. On and off the
battlefield, courage is the
first characteristic of
generalship” (p. 18) Perhaps
taking note of Yingling’s
well-known commentary
might have prompted
Secretary Gates (Rumsfeld’s
successor) to offer in a
speech to cadets at West
Point, “listen to me very
carefully—if as an officer
you don’t tell blunt truths or
create an environment
where candor is
encouraged, then you’ve
done yourself and the
institution a disservice”
(Gates, 2008).
Uncertainty avoidance.
While the original phrase
“uncertainty avoidance” was
developed by Cyert and
March (1963) to describe
organizational risk-taking
phenomena, Hofstede (1991)
extended the concept to
culturally-based phenom-
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ena. In his view, uncertainty
avoidance is “the extent to
which members of a culture
feel threatened by
ambiguous or unknown
situations” (Hofstede, 1991:
118). In his study of 74
cultures, Hofstede ranked
the U.S. as low on
uncertainty avoidance at a
score of 62. The GLOBE
study has commented that
while it is common to the
human condition to live
through uncertainty,
ambiguity, and change, the
authors have questioned
whether people are ever
emotionally at ease in those
situations. The question is
how emotionally comfortable
people are in those circumstances (House et al., 2004).
This is an issue for our
military leader-ship in
Afghanistan and Iraq to
consider—i.e., how much
uncertainty can a population be expected to stand
before negative spillovers
flow out from the civilian
population and thwart
military missions and goals.
The GLOBE study also
noted that in low uncertainty avoidance cultures
like America the leader is
recognized “as a heroic
warrior… admired for their
taking off for unchartered
territory and willingly facing
great risks without
guarantee of a successful
ending” (Chhokar,
Brodbeck, & House, 2007:
509). Arguably, after a
decade of being at war, the
U.S. citizenry can be said to
be more skittish, and less
tolerant of risk, as it relates
to loss of life on the
battlefield. Sgt. Michael
Hanson (2008), U.S. Marine
Corps, commented that risk
aversion that has had a
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negative impact on his
Marines:
Our Marines are
overloaded. This
weight limits their
speed, mobility,
range, stamina,
agility and all
around fighting
capability. They can’t
go out far and they
can’t stay out long
with all of this gear.
It is simply too
much. Combat
patrols are typically
four hours, and even
that short amount of
time is exhausting.
Our Marines are
being consistently
outrun and outmaneuvered by an
enemy with an AK
[rifle], an extra magazine and a pair of
running shoes,
(Hanson, 2008).
In the modern era of irregular warfare a military
leaders more than ever
needs to understand the
enemy’s level of risk tolerance as well as that of their
own.
Time orientation. In
America, time is viewed as a
previous commodity, to be
utilized efficiently and
effectively: “hence the
impatient, ‘I got it’” or the
exhortation to “cut to the
bottom line” (VanOtten,
2005: 32). Within other
cultures, the bottom line is
not so critical and to invoke
it in a conversation or to
“cut to the chase” may
appear to be rude and
uncultured. Such societies
take a long-term view as
evident by the belief that
what does not get done
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today can be done tomorrow
or in a week. The GLOBE
study noted that cultures
with low future orientation
are more willing to “enjoy
the moment.” In the
American culture, time is
experienced in linear
fashion, as a commodity
that is limited and must be
utilized efficiently. Such
cultures, according to the
GLOBE study have “high
future orientation with a
strong capability and
willingness to imagine
future contingencies,
formulate future goal states,
and seek to achieve goals
and develop strategies for
meeting their future
orientations” (Chhokar,
Brodbeck, & House, 2007:
282).
In the arena of
international bargaining, or
the military-diplomatic
world, an American Colonel
of Department of State
diplomat may want to come
to a negotiated settlement in
a rapid manner, whereas his
counterpart in Brazil may
wish to pursue relationshipbuilding prior to negotiation.
The Brazilian’s decisionmaking strategy is likely to
be to focus on building trust
in the relationship first, and
then to attend to the legal
and formal agreements. To
the Brazilian, if there is a
poor relationship between
the parties then the formal
agreements will not likely
stand up to the test of time
(Deresky, 2006).
Relationship-building,
however, is a timeconsuming task, and it
displays a willingness to
commit time and effort to
achieving it. Hence, a
military leader needs to
understand how coalition
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partner’s thinking
associated with time affects
planning military operations. Colonel Michael Lewis
(2009) spoke at a War
College class on the value of
patience and relationshipbuilding that he observed
while in stationed in Iraq.
During our meetings
with the Iraqi officers
nothing of substance
occurred until the
Iraqis felt a
relationship had
been formed, coffee
and tea served,
stories of families
and friends were
shared, and small
talk comprised the
entire first three
meetings. Once the
Iraqis felt
comfortable, the
business of
understanding each
other and working to
solve common
problems began. The
Iraqis sent the same
six officers each
time. Our mistake
was changing our
coalition officers
after the fourth
meeting to allow
more coalition
officers to
participate.
Immediately the
dynamic changed,
and the meetings
reverted back to the
initial stages of small
talk and relationship
building. At the start
of the fourth meeting
the coalition officers
could sense
something was
different about the
Iraqi's willingness to
discuss business
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and to begin where
we previously left
discussions. After
the meeting our
coalition translator
was approached by
the senior Iraqi
officer and asked to
be informed of the
names of the
participating
coalition officer prior
to the next meeting.
We immediately
realized why the
dynamics had
changed; we would
have to start from
the beginning and
build that bond or
relationship again
before any further
information sharing
could occur in any
meaningful way,
(Lewis, 2009: XX).

Conclusion

This article began by
identifying the need for
military leaders to
understand ways how
cognition influence thinking
about issues that may have
strategic importance and
the need for this cultural
understanding of ourselves,
as well as our allies and
enemies in order to
effectively use SMART Power
to achieve favorable
outcomes in Afghanistan
and in other regions. Within
the U.S. and coalition
military organizations,
leaders must seriously
reflect on how their thinking
is influenced by their
cultural perceptions. Such
reflection in necessary to
reveal cognitive and cultural
blind spots that could prove
detrimental to achieving
U.S. national security
interests and thereby
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undermine its influence in
the global arena. The
authors offer this
conceptual paper to
generate further study on
the impacts of cognition on
culture for use in the
implementation of U.S.
national strategies and
policies.
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